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Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-judicial Enforcement of 
Global Public Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law  
Elisa Morgera* 
 
Abstract 
The interaction between bilateral and multilateral action is evolving in the context of ‘global 
environmental law’ – a concept that is emerging from the promotion of environmental 
protection as a global public good through a plurality of legal mechanisms relying on a 
plurality of legal orders. The notion of global public goods can thus help one better to 
understand recent bilateral initiatives aimed at supporting the implementation of multilateral 
environmental agreements and the decisions of their compliance mechanisms. Innovative 
linkages between the compliance system under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species and bilateral trade agreements recently concluded by the European 
Union and the US provide an example. Innovative opportunities for bilateral initiatives 
supporting the implementation of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing 
are likely to lead to even more complex inter-relationships between different legal orders. 
This new approach to bilateralism that aims to support the interests of the international 
community can be assessed in the context of earlier debates on unilateralism, with a view to 
emphasizing the role of international law in the identification and delivery of global public 
goods, and the role of global environmental law in understanding the interactions among a 
plurality of legal orders. 
This article aims to discuss the usefulness of the literature on global public goods in relation 
to the plurality of legal orders and forms of non-judicial enforcement of international law. It 
will do so by relying on global environmental law as a concept that explains the promotion of 
environmental protection as a global public good through a plurality of legal mechanisms 
relying on a plurality of legal orders. To that end, it will focus on a nouvelle vague of 
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 bilateral initiatives spearheaded by the United States and the European Union (EU) that are 
specifically aimed to contribute to the implementation of multilateral environmental 
agreements – thus, putting bilateralism to the service of the international community – and to 
complement a specific feature of multilateral environmental agreements – their compliance 
mechanisms – as non-judicial approaches to enforcement issues.1 In particular, I will refer to 
international biodiversity law as a testing ground that allows one to explore the plurality of 
legal orders. For present purposes, plurality of legal orders points to the development of law 
‘within, outside and above the State’, as well as the increasing interactions and reciprocal 
influences between different regimes of international regulation, and creative patterns of 
interplay between national and international regulation.2 Reference to plurality of legal orders 
will therefore also include expressions of plurality within the international legal order.3 
Accordingly, the article will start with an introduction to global environmental law as 
a lens to focus on the links between international environmental law and the plurality of legal 
orders. It will then proceed with a discussion of the usefulness of the global public good 
literature to understanding developments in international and global environmental law. All 
these concepts will then be pulled together in relation to the non-judicial enforcement of 
multilateral environmental agreements by the compliance mechanisms established at the 
multilateral level and separate bilateral initiatives. These connections and their implications 
will be specifically tested in two scenarios: the first scenario consists of existing innovative 
links between the compliance system under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES)4 and bilateral trade agreements recently concluded by the EU 
and the US; secondly, a future scenario preliminarily identifies innovative opportunities for 
bilateral initiatives supporting the implementation of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-sharing5 in an even more complex web of different legal orders. The article will 
conclude with an assessment of a new approach to bilateralism that aims to support the 
interests of the international community, placing it in the context of earlier debates on 
                                       
1 See generally Wolfrum, ‘Means of Compliance with and Enforcement of International Environmental Law’, 
272 RdC (1998) 23; U. Beyerlin, P.T. Stoll, and R. Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (2006); T. Treves et al. (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and 
the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (2009). 
2 Francioni, ‘Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural Goods’, this issue. 
3 As discussed by Schaffer in ‘International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World’, this 
issue. 
4 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 3 Mar. 1973, 993 
UNTS 243. 
5 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 Oct. 2010, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (Nagoya 
Protocol), available at: www.cbd.int/abs/text/. 
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unilateralism, with a view to emphasizing the role of international law in the identification 
and delivery of global public goods, and the role of global environmental law in 
understanding the interactions among a plurality of legal orders to that end. 
  
1 Global Environmental Law and the Plurality of Legal Orders  
The concept of ‘global environmental law’ is increasingly used to challenge the inter-state 
paradigm of international environmental law. By focusing on issues of common interest to 
humanity as a whole, international environmental law has increasingly been characterized by 
a shift from a discretionary to a functional role of states (as protectors of the common interest 
of humanity) and the growing role of global institutions in international law-making.6 As a 
result, individuals and groups are identified as ‘beneficiaries’ (but not as ‘addressees’) of 
international environmental law: that is, international environmental law ‘formally addresses 
states’ but it assumes a global dimension in crucially ‘affect[ing] states and individuals and 
groups in society’.7 
Global environmental law captures this evolving trait of international environmental 
law and places it in the context of interactions between a plurality of legal orders. Global 
environmental law is thus a ‘field of law that is international, national and transnational in 
character all at once’ and comprises ‘the set of legal principles developed by national, 
international and translational environmental regulatory systems to protect the environment 
and manage natural resources’ with a view to increasingly affecting private behaviour.8 
Notably for present purposes, the emergence of global environmental law is considered a 
consequence of the ‘emerging recognition of global public goods’ in the environmental 
sphere9 and of the increasing public powers exercised by international organizations and 
other non-state actors in the supply of these goods.10  
The interaction of different legal orders captured by global environmental law can be 
seen as the result of transplantation – the borrowing of legal principles and tools from the 
                                       
6 Hey, ‘Common Interests and the (Re)constitution of the Public Space’, 39 Environmental Policy and L (2009) 
152. 
7 Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law and Global Institutions: A System Lacking “Good Process”’, in R. Pierik 
and W. Werner (eds), Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory 
(2010), at 45, 50. 
8 Yang and Percival, ‘The Emergence of Global Environmental Law’, 36 Ecology LQ (2009) 615. 
9 Ibid., at 626. 
10 E. Hey, Global Environmental Law (2009). On the role of the private sector in international environmental 
law see E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (2009). 
 national to the international level,11 in addition to the adaptation of legal principles and tools 
from one country to another.12 Global environmental law further accounts for convergence – 
the spontaneous similarities in legal responses in different countries to similar external 
pressures and the linking of national systems, which can be explained by the growing 
constraints imposed upon states by international environmental law13 and the expectations 
international environmental law creates in terms of implementation by private entities.14  
While I am not persuaded that global environmental law is a separate area of law,15 
the concept is certainly useful as a methodological framework and as a research and teaching 
agenda: it prompts the study of environmental law at the international, regional, and national 
levels as inter-related and mutually influencing systems, it encourages the use of comparative 
methods in that endeavour,16 and it calls for an analysis of the practice of non-state actors, 
particularly international organizations, international networks of experts providing advice on 
environmental legislation across the globe, international civil society, and the private sector.  
The concept of global environmental law thus assists in understanding the ‘functional’ 
role of states and the ‘functionalization of national sovereignty’17 arising from the evolution 
of international environmental law in the context of the plurality of legal orders. States 
exercise ‘delegated powers in the interest of humankind’ rather than freely relying on their 
national sovereignty18 because international environmental law formulates their international 
responsibility at the service of the well-being of individuals and certain groups within their 
own territory, as well as of future generations, on the basis of the identification of certain 
environmental issues that are of common concern.19 Against this background, global 
environmental law then allows the exploration of the implications of the functional role of 
states under international environmental law in the interactions of international, national, and 
transnational law.  
                                       
11 Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’, 22 EJIL (2011) 949; Wiener, ‘Something Borrowed for 
Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law’, 27 Ecology LQ (2001) 
1295.  
12 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974). 
13 Yang and Percival, supra note 8. 
14 Hey, supra note 7, at 50.  
15 As Yang and Percival, supra note 8, at 664, seem to suggest. 
16 Albeit further study is needed to define specific methodological challenges in that respect: see Ellis, supra 
note 11; Wiener, supra note 11; Momirov and Naudé Fourie, ‘Vertical Comparative Law Methods: Tools for 
Conceptualising the International Rule of Law’, 2 Erasmus L Rev (2009) 291; Roberts, ‘Comparative 
International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’, 60 ICLQ 
(2011) 57. 
17 Francioni, supra note 2. 
18 Dupuy, ‘Humanity and the Environment’, 2 Colorado J Int’l Environmental L & Policy (1991) 203. 
19 Hey, supra note 7, at 51 and 54. 
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To this end, global environmental law also emphasizes the role of common but 
differentiated responsibility under international law.20 Common but differentiated 
responsibility encapsulates the need for concerted action by all states to contribute to the 
‘general global welfare’ based on mutual responsibility and solidarity as the basis for a sense 
of community and global partnership.21 This concept, the status of which in international law 
is still subject to debate,22 may justify the design of different international obligations to 
account for differences in the current socio-economic situations of countries, their historical 
contribution to a specific environmental problem, and their current capabilities to address it.23 
It may also support the role of developed countries in taking the lead in addressing global 
environmental issues,24 thus providing a justification of unilateral or bilateral initiatives, but 
also entailing the respect on the part of developed countries for the allocation of less 
burdensome obligations on developing countries.25 Furthermore, common but differentiated 
responsibility is usually translated into developed countries’ obligations to transfer 
technology and ‘new and additional’ financial means to developing countries to enable them 
to implement international environmental obligations.26 In that respect, it serves as a ‘test for 
the seriousness of efforts and willingness to cooperate’ of developed countries.27   Common 
but differentiated responsibility thus symbolizes the interrelation between the rights and 
obligations of states under multilateral environmental agreements and the underlying 
cooperation based on an equitable contribution to a common task.28 The underlying solidarity 
can be understood because of the essential significance attached by states to certain public 
goods in their mutual relations, the ethical value attached to these goods by humankind, and 
                                       
20 Ibid., at 50. 
21 Simma, supra note *, at 238–239. 
22 Rio Declaration, Principles 6–7. See generally L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International 
Environmental Law (2006). For a discussion on its status in international law compare Hey, ‘Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(2012), at 444, who considers it a general principle of international law; and Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in International Law’, 98 AJIL (2004) 276, who concludes that it is not ‘a customary principle 
of international law’. 
23 On the equity dimension of common but differentiated responsibility see Shelton, ‘Equity’, in D. Bondansky, 
J Brunnee, and E Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2007), at 638, 656–
658, and 661–662. 
24 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC), Art. 3. 
25 There are various examples in MEAs of differentiated responsibilities: the most notable is the Kyoto Protocol 
to the UNFCCC (11 Dec. 1997, 2303 UNTS 148), which provides for quantified and time-bound obligations to 
mitigate climate change only for so-called ‘Annex-I countries’, i.e. developed countries. 
26 This is a common obligation across MEAs, although it is most clearly expressed in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (CBD), Art. 20(4). 
27 Streck, ‘Ensuring New Finance and Real Emission Reduction: A Critical Review of the Additionality 
Concept’, 2 Carbon and Climate L Rev (2011) 158, at 159–160 and 168. 
28 Wolfrum, supra note 1, at 112. 
 the special vulnerability of the public good.29 It therefore represents a ‘new form of 
reciprocity [that] also serves as a mechanism to provide compliance’.30 Looking into common 
but differentiated responsibility through the lens of global environmental law permits one to 
highlight instances in which the functional exercise of national sovereignty is at the service 
not only of developing countries, but also of the well-being of individuals and groups in 
developing countries. 
 
2 Global Public Goods and International Environmental Law 
Global public goods are increasingly discussed as a useful framework for understanding 
international cooperation and the incentives that are necessary to realize global 
achievements that benefit humanity in the absence of a supranational authority capable of 
compelling states to do so.31 As noted above, global public goods are also part and parcel of 
the debate on global environmental law. This section will explain how the global public 
good literature can usefully inform the analysis of the interactions between international 
environmental law and a plurality of other legal orders (global environmental law), while 
also pointing to the role of international environmental law in the identification and supply 
of global public goods.32 
Global public goods have already been identified by international lawyers as a useful 
concept for understanding the interests of the international community; they refer to 
common values the benefits of which are ‘indivisibly spread among the entire community’ 
and are typically non-rival and non-excludable,33 so that nobody has a rational economic 
incentive to supply them because everyone equally benefits from these goods and nobody 
can be excluded from their benefits.34 In addition, undermining global public goods 
‘necessarily affects the enjoyment of their benefits by all members of the community, that is 
the community as a whole, and these goods cannot be protected only for the benefit of 
                                       
29 Villalpando, ‘The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How Community Interests are Protected 
in International Law’, 21 EJIL (2010) 387, at 396. 
30 Wolfrum, supra note 1, at 148. 
31 S. Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentives to Supply Global Public Goods (2007), at 19.  
32 The need for economics and political science literature on international environmental cooperation to be 
‘compatible with international law’ has ‘largely been ignored’ according to S.  Barrett, Environment and 
Statecraft (2003), at p.xv. 
33 On the distinction between global public goods and public goods see Villalpaldo, supra note 29, at 392–394 
(although the author refers to ‘public goods’ in his piece), and on exceptions to non-excludability and non-
rivalry see comments by Bodansky, ‘What’s in a Concept?  Global Public Goods, International Law, and 
Legitimacv’, this issue; Schaffer, supra note 3. 
34 Villalpando, supra note 29, at 392–394, in particular at n. 18. 
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certain members.’35 This results in advanced forms of cooperation because the ‘appraisal of 
costs and benefits can no longer be made at the individual level, and the collective interest 
is to be realized even when it implies a sacrifice of the [individual] sphere of the ...members 
of the group’.36 From this perspective, the global public goods literature could be usefully 
employed to complement legal debates on international law as a law of coexistence and law 
of cooperation,37 and on the role of the international community as the ‘repository of 
interests that transcend those of individual states uti singuli’.38 
Global public goods, as highlighted by Daniel Bodansky and Gregory Schaffer, can 
be supplied in different ways.39 Two types of supply appear particularly useful for the 
purposes of the present analysis, that is for questions of governance and legitimacy of 
bilateralism at the service of community interests: aggregate-efforts and single-best-effort 
global public goods. Aggregate efforts of the whole international communities are required 
to tackle global environmental challenges that not even the largest, most resourced countries 
can address on their own.40 One notorious example of an aggregate-effort global public 
good is the fight against climate change.41 This seems to suggest that economic analysis and 
international environmental law42 coincide in identifying issues of common concern of 
humankind as the ‘legitimate object of international regulation and supervision’.43 These 
issues, which are concerned with ‘protective actions’ rather than specific resources or areas, 
signal that ‘states’ freedom of action may be subject to limits even where other states’ 
sovereign rights are not affected directly in terms of transboundary harm’.44 In other words, 
these are goods of universal character that require global common action, that give rise to a 
legitimate interest of the whole international community and to a common responsibility to 
assist in their protection.45 The identification of issues of common concern by international 
                                       
35 Ibid., at 392–393. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’, 9 EJIL (1998) 248, at 251, where reference is made to 
law of cooperation as based on the ‘awareness among legal subjects of the existence of a common interest or 
common value which cannot be protected or promoted unilaterally, but only by a common effort’. The point 
was made by Bodansky, supra note 33. 
38 Simma and Paulus, ‘The “International Community”: Facing the Challenge of Globalization’, 9 EJIL (1998) 
266. 
39 Supra notes 34 and 4 respectively. 
40 Barrett, supra note 31, at 101. 
41 Ibid., at 84–100. 
42 UNFCCC, preamble; CBD, preamble. On the need for international consensus on the identification of 
common concern see Brunnee, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage and Common Concern’, in Bondansky, 
Brunnee, and Hey, supra note 23, at 550, 565. 
43  P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (2009), at 128 and 131. 
44 Brunnee, supra note 42, at 565–566. 
45 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 43, at 128. 
 law results in limiting national sovereignty of individual states and holding them 
accountable for compliance with their international obligations through international 
institutions with supervisory powers.46  
The merit of using the global public good literature lies in the identification of risks of 
free-riding in the international regulation of issues of common concern: even if a group of 
countries supplies this type of good, others will not have an incentive to step up their efforts 
to do so. Thus, an economic perspective underlines that international treaties need to create 
not only controls but also incentives to make participation attractive and compliance 
likely.47 The analysis of issues of common concern in the global public good literature 
highlights that the supply of these goods relies on the leadership of certain countries, whose 
successful efforts then also benefit other countries with fewer resources.48 This clearly 
reflects one dimension of common but differentiated responsibility that is coupled with the 
identification of common concern in international environmental treaties.49 It further 
reflects the need for financial and technical solidarity towards developing countries with a 
view to benefitting humanity as a whole. Common but differentiated responsibility can thus 
be seen as the by-product of aggregate-efforts global public goods and a potential 
justification for single-best-effort global public goods. 
Single-best-effort global public goods, however, are goods that can be supplied ‘mini-
laterally’, that is by one or a restricted group of countries to the benefit of all other 
countries.  They become particularly relevant in situations in which multilateralism fails to 
provide or delays urgent responses.50 Single best efforts can possibly also catalyze the 
creation of a coordinated response by other countries51 (leading by example), thereby 
contributing to international cooperation52 and possibly promoting multilateral standard-
setting.53 Their role can be essential when multilateralism is seen as an expression of what is 
‘politically feasible’ rather than necessarily a guarantee of advancing the international 
community’s interests and the needs of human beings as a whole.54 Thus, international legal 
scholars have already debated the possible benefits of unilateralism as the extra-territorial 
                                       
46 Ibid., at 130 and 132. 
47 Barrett, supra note 31, at 101. 
48 Ibid., at 189. 
49 Characterized as a ‘common sharing of burdens of cooperation and problem solving’ by Brunnee, supra note 
42, at 566. 
50 Ibid., at 41. 
51 Ibid., at ch. 1. 
52 Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Unilateralism and Environmental Protection: Issues of Perception and Reality of 
Issues’, 11 EJIL (2000) 315, at 318. 
53 Bodansky, ‘What’s so Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?’, 11 EJIL (2000) 339, at 344. 
54 Alvarez, ‘Multilateralism and its Discontents’, 11 EJIL (2000) 393, at 398. 
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legislative or enforcement action in the face of the ‘obstinate refusal’ to negotiate, join, or 
enforce international treaties.55  
One can thus distinguish initiatives within a multilateral framework geared to 
supplying aggregate-efforts global public goods from other initiatives beyond such a 
framework that are geared to supplying a single-best effort global public good.56 The latter, 
however, while being undertaken outside a multilateral framework, may still contribute to 
reaching its objectives: that would be the case of bilateral initiatives aimed to support the 
implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. The global public good literature 
can thus serve to challenge the traditional understanding of bilateralism as the relationships 
whereby each state protects its own rights and third states have no possibility to object to 
such a course of action, and as a ‘severe obstacle standing in the way of stronger solidarity 
in international relations’.57  
Looking at bilateral initiatives from the perspective of the global public goods 
literature allows one better to understand governance problems associated with single-best-
effort global public goods. These mini-lateral initiatives may carry risks or cause other harm 
(including a more serious risk or harm than the benefit that will be received through the 
supply of the single-best-effort global public good) to certain countries, and ultimately the 
decisions and balancing of benefits and risks are in the hands of the country or group of 
countries that have the power and incentive to supply these goods.58 In the words of Scott 
Barrett, ‘those countries unilaterally providing single-best-effort global public goods cannot 
be counted upon to take into account the interests of other countries’.59 From the viewpoint 
of international law, critical questions as to the identification of extraterritorial effects60 of 
such mini-lateral initiatives thus remain controversial. In addition, a legitimacy question 
also surrounds the determination that multilateralism is at a certain point in time ineffective 
or incapable of delivering certain global public goods, which underpins unilateral or mini-
                                       
55 See generally 11 EJIL (2000) (issues 1–2) special issue and in particular Jansen, ‘The Limits of Unilateralism 
from a European Perspective’, 11 EJIL (2000) 309, at 310–312. 
56 I am grateful to Gracia Marín Durán for suggesting this terminology. 
57 Simma, supra note *, at 229–231 and 233. 
58 Barrett, supra note 31, at 23. For a discussion from a legal viewpoint see Bodansky, supra note 53, at 339–
341. 
59 Barrett, supra note 31, at 45. 
60 See the distinction drawn by Kokott AG between extraterritorial effects and extraterritorial implications with 
regard to EU internal measures that do not embody a concrete rule of conduct for subjects beyond the territory 
of the EU, but still create an indirect incentive for them: Opinion, Case C–366/10 Air Transport Association of 
America and Others, 6 Oct. 2011, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-
366/10#, at paras 145–147. 
 lateral actions.61 The actual urgency, or in all events appropriate timing at which it becomes 
unreasonable to wait any longer for the development of a multilateral solution, and therefore 
acceptable to proceed unilaterally or mini-laterally remains a matter of contention.62 Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, for instance, suggests that the multilateral route should be deviated from only 
when states have exercised without success the ‘diligence that might be reasonably expected 
of them’ to reach a mutually accepted solution.63  
These legitimacy concerns are particularly important in situations in which single-
best-effort global public goods may affect the incentives to supply related goods64 (notably, 
aggregate-efforts goods) – so, when unilateral or mini-lateral initiatives may undermine or 
circumvent the international law deriving from multilateral frameworks, by ‘effectively 
preempting official decisions to be taken by a legally designated [international] entity’65 – 
or may result in the imposition of one country’s own interpretation of international law on 
others.66 Once again, these risks are well-known to international lawyers (and remain 
topical) vis-à-vis unilateralism and its potential to ‘avoid, mitigate or reinterpret legally 
required outcomes’,67 or to ‘coerce states’ to adopt an approach ‘favoured’ by the state(s) 
supplying single-best-effort goods.68 A practical example that has recently been discussed in 
legal literature is the EU’s unilateral initiative to include the aviation sector in its emission 
trading scheme as a way of imposing the EU’s interpretation of the international climate 
regime while taking the lead at a time at which the multilateral system was unable to make 
progress on the issue.69  
Possible solutions to these governance problems can, according to a somewhat 
circular logic, still be found in international (environmental) law, which can provide 
mechanisms for the coordination of different countries’ unilateral or mini-lateral initiatives, 
put pressure on these countries supplying single-best-effort goods to exercise restraint, 
allow other countries to have a say in mini-lateral initiatives that may negatively impact 
                                       
61 Reisman, ‘Unilateral Action and the Transformation of the World Constitute Process: The Special Problem of 
Humanitarian Intervention’, 11 EJIL (2000) 3, at 6. 
62 These are the words of Kokott AG, supra note 60, at paras 185–186. The problem of the timing of unilateral 
measures is also discussed by Jansen, supra note 55, at 313; and Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 52, at 332; 
Bodansky supra note 53, at 347. 
63 Dupuy, ‘The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law’, 11 EJIL (2000) 19, at 24. 
64 Barrett supra note 31, at 23. 
65 Reisman, supra note 61, at 3–4. 
66 Barrett, supra note 31, at 23.  
67 Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 52, at 317. 
68 Bodansky, supra note 53, at 347. 
69 Compare Scott and Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism: International Aviation in the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme’, 23 EJIL (2012) 000 and Kulovesi, ‘“Make Your Own Special Song, Even if 
Nobody Else Sings Along”: International Aviation Emissions and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’, 2 
Climate L (2011) 535. 
(2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 743-767 
upon them, or facilitate their participation in these efforts, which eventually confers 
legitimacy on them.70  
The synergies between mini-lateral and multilateral action point to an interaction of 
aggregate-efforts and single-best-effort global public goods that is the central theme of this 
article, which will be explored in relation to the effective implementation of multilateral 
environmental agreements through bilateral initiatives. The implementation and 
enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements are a collective problem that would 
appear to be an aggregate-efforts global public good.71 Enforcement of international law, 
however, remains the ‘multilateralists’ Achilles heel’72 and recent practice shows that treaty 
implementation and enforcement are increasingly delivered as single-best-effort global 
public goods for which a limited number of states provide new incentives (additional to 
those offered by international institutions) to other countries lagging behind in 
implementation. Another dimension, that is only touched upon in this article but represents 
an essential element for evaluating the legitimacy of bilateralism, is the respect for financial 
solidarity obligations under multilateral environmental treaties when operating beyond 
multilateral framework. Financial solidarity obligations are a further reflection of common 
but differentiated responsibility73 and in principle an aggregate-efforts global public good: it 
is the total effort of financial contributions by rich countries that determines the reaching of 
certain international objectives74 to the benefit of the whole international community.75 In 
practice, however, the qualified and open-ended formulation of these international 
obligations in multilateral environmental agreements can lead to their delivery as single-
best-effort global public good: they are often seen as voluntary commitments, provided 
unilaterally, and compliance is not systematically monitored at the multilateral level.76 
                                       
70 Barret identifies these options, (supra note 31, at 32, 37, 111), but without discussing the role of international 
law in providing such responses. The need for those affected by unilateral decisions to participate in the 
decision-making process as a condition for the legitimacy of unilateral action is also highlighted by Bodansky, 
supra note 53, at 341. 
71 Barrett, supra note 31, at 82. 
72 Alvarez, supra note 54, at 402. 
73 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 Sept. 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (Montreal 
Protocol), Art. 5.7; CBD Art. 20.4; UNFCCC, Art. 4.7; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 
22 May 2001, 2256 UNTS 119 (Stockholm Convention), Art. 13.4 (see comments on the legal implications of 
these provisions by Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Technical and Financial Assistance’, in Bondansky, Brunnee, and 
Hey, supra note 23, at 947, 970). 
74 Barrett, supra note 31, at 8 and 81. 
75 This is more clearly reflected in second-generation financial mechanisms under multilateral environmental 
agreements that seek to address issues of common concern with a view to achieving global benefits through 
cooperative action: Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 73, at 963–966. 
76 Romanin Jacur, ‘Controlling and Assisting Compliance: Financial Aspects’, in Treves et al., supra note 1, at 
419, 435. 
 The global public goods literature may thus help to highlight the governance risks 
inherent in employing bilateralism with a view to contributing to effective and fair 
partnership in implementing international environmental law beyond multilateral 
frameworks.77 This literature can therefore dispel concerns about the ‘moral deficiencies of 
bilateralism’ as an approach to international cooperation that does not contribute to a 
‘socially conscious legal order’, to international solidarity, and to the common interests of 
the international community comprising ‘in the last instance human beings’.78 The 
interaction between single-best-effort and aggregate-effort global public goods may thus 
show that bilateralism, as opposed to being superseded or even abolished by community 
elements of international law,79 has been returned to in order explicitly and systematically to 
put it to the service of the realization of community interests. In that regard, the ‘moral 
basis’ that can persuasively justify certain states’ claims to contribute on their own to the 
pursuit of community interests necessarily lies in a mutual relationship with multilateralism. 
 
3 Non-judicial Enforcement of Global Environmental Law  
The compliance mechanisms established under multilateral environmental agreements 
provide ideal ‘laboratories’ for the analysis of the interactions between different legal orders 
at the international, national, and local levels. Compliance mechanisms can be seen as the 
regime-specific collective form of non-judicial enforcement that is a logical consequence of 
the focus of international environmental law on issues of common concern and its 
functionalization of the role of states.80 These mechanisms address issues of non-compliance 
as a threat to the existence of a community established with the intention of collectively 
achieving the objective of the multilateral environmental agreement.81 They allow not only 
the states concerned in the compliance procedure to be involved in the discussions on alleged 
non-compliance, but also all other parties to the agreement to participate with a view to 
finding a collective solution.82 Compliance mechanisms are also increasingly participating in 
the dynamic interaction between different legal orders: they may creatively cooperate with 
national courts and international tribunals, interact in official and unofficial ways with NGOs, 
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79 Ibid., at 235. 
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and even have an impact on private actors.83 They can thus be seen as a component of global 
environmental law. 
As will be discussed below, recent bilateral initiatives refer to, or incorporate the 
findings of, compliance mechanisms with a view to contributing to the effective 
implementation of multilateral environmental agreements beyond the multilateral setting (in 
an effort to supply single-best-effort global public goods). Interestingly, these bilateral 
initiatives are not meant to provide an alternative to multilateral non-judicial enforcement, 
but rather a complement to it. Reliance on compliance mechanisms is a key to exploring the 
dynamic relationship between multilateralism and bilateralism with a view to assessing 
whether states supplying single-best-effort global public goods engage in a ‘self-serving’ 
exercise or rather provide dynamic and responsive solutions to impasses at the multilateral 
level or implementation gaps.84 In that regard, reliance on compliance mechanisms can be 
considered a ground for assessing the legitimacy of single-best-effort global public goods. 
In particular, the compliance mechanisms developed under the composite international 
biodiversity regime have been selected as a case study. From a global public good 
perspective, the international biodiversity regime aims to supply the aggregate-efforts global 
public good of biodiversity conservation, as an issue of common concern, and has set in place 
innovative ways to ensure international cooperation as well as national and local partnerships 
between state and non-state actors.85 Within the international biodiversity regime two 
scenarios have been selected: an existing one and a future one. The existing scenario 
concerns the compliance systems under CITES and its links with US and EU bilateral trade 
measures. The second scenario concerns the future compliance mechanism under the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing, and its reliance on an increasing plurality of legal 
orders, with a view to identifying opportunities and challenges for single-best-effort global 
public goods in that context.  
A A Shift towards Bilateralism to Support CITES Implementation 
                                       
83 Cardesa-Salzmann, supra note 80. 
84 Shaffer and Bodansky, ‘Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law’, 1 Transnat’l Environmental 
L (2012) 31. 
85 For instance, the legal concept of benefit-sharing has evolved under the CBD as a tool for inter-state 
cooperation as well as for partnership between states, local communities, and the private sector: Morgera and 
Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods', 15 RECIEL 
(2010) 150. 
 As opposed to other multilateral environmental treaties, CITES has developed over time a 
complex compliance system which, among a plurality of compliance procedures,86 includes 
an international machinery for the monitoring of national legislation subject to trade 
sanctions. CITES’ National Legislation Project has since 1992 enabled the CITES 
Secretariat, in the absence of an explicit basis in the Convention in this regard, to determine 
whether parties’ national legislation adequately implements the Convention, by categorizing 
each country’s legislation as meeting all, some, or none of the requirements for implementing 
CITES. The categorization is based on a clear articulation of the minimum requirements set 
by CITES in terms of implementing the convention in national law: designation of competent 
authorities, prohibition of trade in specimens in violation of the convention; penalization of 
such trade, and the confiscation of specimens illegally traded or possessed. Countries in the 
lower category have to develop a ‘CITES Legislation Plan’ establishing agreed steps and a 
timeframe for the adoption of national legislation; failing to submit the Plan or to adopt 
adequate legislation by set deadlines may result in the recommended suspension of 
commercial trade in all CITES species with the party, although the Secretariat may withhold 
action if good legislative progress has been made by a party.87   
The Project has, on the one hand, increased the CITES Secretariat’s work in assisting 
countries in developing or revising their implementing legislation. Upon request, the 
Secretariat reviews and comments on draft legislation. It has also developed a legislative 
guidance package (containing a model law, legislative checklist, and format for legislative 
analysis). In addition, it convenes regional and national workshops on drafting CITES-
implementing legislation, fields experts to assist countries in developing legislation, and has 
set up various bilateral and multilateral legislative projects.88 As the extent of CITES support 
has been limited by its ‘shrinking budget and limited funds from external sources’,89 the 
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87 CITES Resolution Conf. 8.4 which instructs the Standing Committee to determine which Parties have not 
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gradual expansion of the Secretariat’s mandate and notably the introduction of field work 
have led to increasing interactions with non-state actors.90 NGOs in particular have played a 
significant role in the compliance mechanisms under CITES, in both formal and informal 
ways, either by volunteering information on country compliance or running capacity-building 
and training activities to support national enforcement efforts.91 Furthermore, CITES’ 
Legislation Project has enabled CITES to exercise international surveillance and monitoring 
of national implementation, which rests on the possibility for the CITES Standing Committee 
to recommend that poor performance under the Legislation Project, where all possible efforts 
do not achieve the desired result, is sanctioned with trade suspensions. As a result, national 
legislative sovereignty is closely monitored and significantly influenced by CITES bodies, on 
the basis of a comparative analysis of existing national laws and international guidelines, and 
a network of experts participating in relevant multilateral deliberations and field activities.  
 CITES implementation has long been seen as a global public good that could also be 
supplied through single best efforts. In the past unilateral initiatives had been put in place by 
both the US and EU to support CITES implementation, through the enactment of internal 
legislation providing for the imposition of unilateral trade sanctions on third countries.92 
Recently, however, there seems to have been a shift towards bilateral initiatives supporting 
CITES implementation in third countries. The 2007 US–Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
includes both certain cooperation clauses to address the capacity-building needs of Peru in 
developing, implementing, and enforcing environmental and forest law and protecting 
wildlife and endangered species,93 as well as an obligation for parties to adopt, maintain, and 
implement laws, regulations, and all other measures to fulfill obligations under the 
multilateral environmental agreements listed in an Annex including CITES.94 In addition, an 
Annex to the FTA incorporates Peru’s obligations arising from CITES’ compliance system 
into the bilateral agreement.95 It should be further noted that under the FTA US officials are 
expected to participate in verifications of compliance with Peruvian laws by producers and 
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94 Ibid., Art. 18.2 and Annex 18.2.  
95 Ibid., Annex 18.3.4 on Forest Sector Governance. 
 exporters of timber products.96  
 Although it is not possible to engage in a fully fledged comparison between the EU and 
US practice on integrating CITES implementation issues into bilateral instruments,97 it is 
useful to point to the fact that the EU has attempted to ‘improve’ on US practice in that 
regard.98 The most recent bilateral trade agreements of the EU present a different link with 
multilateral environmental agreements’ compliance mechanisms. They establish a trade-
related obligation effectively to implement key multilateral environmental agreements 
(including CITES).99 In order to promote the sustainable management of forest resources, 
parties commit to work together to improve forest law enforcement and governance and to 
promote trade in legal and sustainable forest products through instruments that may include 
the effective use of CITES with regard to endangered timber species.100  Like those of the 
US, the EU bilateral agreements also include provisions on technical assistance and capacity 
building in the implementation and enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements.101 
In addition, the EU bilateral agreements explicitly prohibit a party from undertaking law 
enforcement activities in the territory of another Party with regards to environmental 
matters.102 
Both the US and the EU bilateral agreements include noteworthy institutional 
provisions. A bilateral institution is put in place under the US–Peru FTA to consider and 
discuss the implementation of the environmental cooperation agreement and submit any 
comments and recommendations, including those received from the public, to the parties. 
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Implementation of the FTA has focused in particular on compliance with the forest-related 
Annex providing that Peru comply with specific recommendations arising from the CITES 
compliance mechanisms by, inter alia, cooperating in a manner that took into account 
decisions and resolutions of the CITES Conference of the Parties as well as its Standing 
Committee, Animals Committee, and Plants Committee. Ultimately, however, compliance 
with the forest-related Annex is subject to the FTA’s dispute settlement provisions, with the 
possibility of imposing sanctions,103 although parties are to defer to CITES’ interpretation of 
the status of implementation of a party to that end.104 In an effort to distance itself from the 
sanction-based approach of the US–Peru FTA, the EU bilateral agreements aim to embody ‘a 
co-operative approach based on common values and interests, taking into account the 
differences in [parties’] levels of development and the respect of their current and future 
needs and aspirations’.105 To this end, a specialized bilateral committee is set up to oversee 
the implementation of the ‘trade and sustainable development’ obligations included in the 
agreement, as well as special procedures for settling trade and environment disputes, 
requiring the involvement of environmental experts, and allowing also for advice to be 
sought from the Secretariats of multilateral environmental agreements. While there is no 
attempt directly to incorporate guidance from relevant compliance mechanisms of the listed 
multilateral environmental agreements, the EU bilateral agreement provides several entry 
points for interaction with multilateral environmental agreements’ Secretariats and their 
compliance mechanisms. For instance, in cases of disagreement or ‘regarding any matter of 
mutual interest’, each party may request consultations106 which, subject to the agreement of 
both parties, can include the soliciting of information from environmental organizations and 
bodies.107 Furthermore, a party may, after certain period of time, ask that a panel/group of 
experts in the field of trade and sustainable development be convened which should also seek 
advice from competent international organizations.108 Notably, the Panel’s recommendations 
shall take into account the particular socio-economic situation of the parties,109 and parties 
are to endeavour to discuss appropriate measures, such as possible cooperation to support the 
implementation of recommended measures.110 It can be expected that the practice developed 
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 under the unilateral Generalized System of Preferences of the EU111 in relation to the 
effective implementation of key multilateral environmental agreements will inform future 
practice under the FTAs, particularly given that FTAs are expected to be concluded with the 
EU GSP+ beneficiaries, and therefore gradually replace the unilateral instrument with a 
bilateral one.112 Accordingly, the EU will mostly focus on the existence of implementing 
legislation in partner countries and relevant assessments made by the compliance 
mechanisms.113  
 This nouvelle vague of bilateral agreements also seeks to allow for public participation. 
The US–Peru FTA tasks the bilateral environmental affairs council with receiving public 
views and comments;114 as well as considering inputs received from each party’s consultative 
or advisory committee established to exchange information relating to the implementation of 
the FTA environmental provisions with the public.115 In addition, any member of the public 
of one party may send submissions asserting that a Party is failing to enforce its 
environmental laws effectively,116 which may lead the council to issue recommendations 
relating to the further development of the party’s mechanisms for monitoring its 
environmental enforcement.117 The EU agreements require the establishment of national 
advisory groups of stakeholders and of a joint civil society forum that can submit findings 
and opinions to the parties on the sustainable development aspects of the bilateral 
agreement’s implementation.118  
 These bilateral initiatives to support the work of compliance mechanism, either by 
providing additional sanctions (that is, providing ‘bigger’ sticks to CITES), as in the US 
case,119 or incentives to support the implementation of the agreement more generally (that is, 
complementing CITES sticks with ‘carrots’), as in the case of the EU. To that extent, the EU 
and US are contributing to the effective implementation of CITES as a single-best-effort 
global public good through bilateral trade measures. In doing so, they provide on a bilateral 
basis layers of monitoring that are additional to those at the multinational level over the state 
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that is found to be in non-compliance. Both innovative models of bilateralism incorporate key 
features of the protection of community interests as identified by Bruno Simma in opposition 
to traditional forms of bilateralism, namely: reliance on or reference to international 
organizations, notably the multilateral environmental agreements compliance mechanisms; a 
broad understanding of the connections between the various interests of the international 
community; and North–South solidarity.120 
 The legitimacy of these initiatives essentially rests on their explicit reliance on the 
assessment of multilateral compliance bodies121 in the case of the US, and possibly in directly 
liaising with them in the context of bilateral trade relations with other countries, in the case of 
the EU.  In addition, it is very significant that bilateralism seems increasingly to adopt a trait 
of the law of cooperation, that of conceiving the application of sanctions only in an 
‘institutionalized context of cooperation’.122 This new form of bilateralism, however, may 
also create legitimacy risks: potentially bilateral trade avenues could subvert the 
internationally determined implications of common but differentiated responsibility under 
multilateral environmental agreements and specific globally determined allocation of 
international responsibility under multilateral environmental agreements’ governance bodies. 
In particular, it remains to be assessed whether appropriate consideration can be given to the 
special circumstances of developing countries outside multilateral system. Equally 
importantly, the link between these bilateral initiatives and the multilateral obligations of 
financial solidarity that are part and parcel of the compliance system under MEAs remain 
significantly unclear. For instance, it has been highlighted that ‘the EU has generally resisted 
undertaking bold commitments on financial and technical assistance as part of the [bilateral] 
negotiations’ and as a result the relevant provisions are framed in ‘very general terms’;123 and 
the amount of external funding that the EU makes available for environmental purposes is 
modest.124 
 A global environmental law perspective, however, would push the analysis beyond 
this point by looking into interactions between multilateral and bilateral international law and 
national law, as well as the role of state and non-state actors in that connection. In that regard, 
it has been argued that the US–Peru FTA, for instance, resulted in ‘transferring regulatory 
                                       
120 Simma, supra note *, at 236–237. 
121 Zvelc, supra note 98. 
122 Abi-Saab, supra note 37, at 253. 
123 Marín Durán and Morgera, supra note 118, at 103. 
124 European Commission, ‘Working Paper on Improving Environmental Integration in Development 
Cooperation’, SEC(2009)555 final, at 4. 
 authority from [CITES] to the bilateral framework created by the free trade agreement’:125 the 
FTA Annex reflected CITES’ recommendations regarding the implementation of mahogany 
trade controls, which had been resisted by Peru in the framework of CITES processes, but 
also went beyond CITES requirements – ‘in effect expanding the scope of CITES beyond 
that which is politically possible under the agreement itself’.126 On the one hand, empirical 
research shows the direct link between the US bilateral initiative and the compliance 
mechanisms, and therefore the positive interaction between single-best-effort and aggregate-
efforts global public goods. The FTA ‘subtly but quickly catalysed Peru’s lagging 
implementation’ of CITES leading to national ‘legislative reform… addressing what was 
previously intractable CITES implementation issues’.127 On the other hand, the same study 
also pointed to the ‘catastrophic social unrest’ which had been caused by the rushed and non-
transparent legislative activity that had significant consequences on indigenous groups’ land 
rights in Peru.128 Notably, national legislative activity had been facilitated both under the 
FTA and in parallel under CITES: both parties to the FTA requested the CITES Secretariat to 
conduct a legislative assistance mission to Peru, and as a result Peru was promoted to 
Category 1 under CITES Legislation Project.129  
 
B Future Compliance with the Nagoya Protocol: Bilateralism and Increasing Plurality of 
Legal Orders 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing is an innovative and cryptic new 
multilateral environmental agreement that has significantly developed the international 
biodiversity regime. It creates new international obligations between countries that provide 
access to and countries that use genetic resources and traditional knowledge, as well as 
spelling out the rights of indigenous and local communities to their traditional knowledge and 
to genetic resources held by them.130 In both respects, the Protocol significantly contributes to 
making states’ role functional to the protection of the interests of their own communities, as 
well as of the communities in other states. The implementation of the Protocol will entail 
complex and creative links between different areas of international law,131 a dynamic web of 
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national laws of provider and user countries and contractual arrangements between private 
parties feeding into a system of internationally recognized certificates,132 and the respect for 
the customary laws of local and indigenous communities at all these regulatory levels.133 The 
effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol will thus essentially rely on a plurality of 
legal orders. Its open-ended provisions, particularly those concerning indigenous peoples and 
local communities’ customary laws and procedures, will probably allow for a variety of legal 
approaches to implementation, through creative relations between local, national, and 
international law. 
The Protocol includes an enabling clause on monitoring compliance at the 
international level, foreseeing the future establishment of a compliance mechanism of a 
cooperative and non-adversarial nature.134 It remains to be seen how compliance with the 
unprecedented obligations of the Protocol will be monitored, particularly compliance with 
obligations vis-à-vis indigenous and local communities or state compliance with obligations 
to ensure that users respect other countries’ national legislation. The novelty of the 
compliance challenges raised by the Protocol was perceived by its negotiators, who 
considered a potentially ground-breaking option in international environmental law – the 
establishment of an international ombudsperson to support parties and indigenous and local 
communities in identifying breaches and to provide technical and legal support in ensuring 
the effective redress of such breaches.135 If such a feature had been included in the Protocol, 
it could have resulted in a compliance mechanism being able to work in different legal 
orders: at the national and local level through field missions, while providing immediate 
access to the international level to these communities.136 While this idea was eventually not 
incorporated into the final text of the Protocol, there is nothing to prevent parties from 
establishing such a body in the future through a decision of the Conference of the Parties. 
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 Otherwise, parties could agree on a stakeholder trigger, similar to that of the Aarhus 
Convention.137 
At all events, a compliance mechanism under the Nagoya Protocol will certainly 
engage with a plurality of legal orders. Even in pure inter-state situations falling under the 
Nagoya Protocol, cooperation between user and provider countries will occur at the level 
both of legislative action138 and of enforcement.139 A future compliance mechanism will 
probably have to assess the compatibility of national measures of different countries with one 
another, the appropriateness of user countries’ national measures to ensure compliance by 
private entities or individuals as users of genetic resources or traditional knowledge with the 
provider country’s legislation, and inter-state collaborative enforcement actions.140 In 
addition, the future compliance mechanism will have to assess respect for communities’ 
customary laws, as well as for applicable community rules and procedures at different levels 
of implementation.141  
To some extent this task may be facilitated by the use of ‘community protocols’ – 
tools attempting to bridge inter-state benefit-sharing with communities’ needs, aspirations, 
and livelihoods.142 Supporting a bottom-up approach, these protocols are written documents 
developed by a community, following a consultative process, to outline the core ecological, 
cultural, and spiritual values and customary laws relating to the community’s traditional 
knowledge and resources, based on which the community provides clear terms and conditions 
to regulate access to its knowledge and resources.143 The protocols therefore can be seen as 
an expression of global environmental law, in linking local and the international legal levels, 
according to standards and procedures set out in customary, national, and international law, 
with a view to mobilizing communities to use international and national law to support the 
local manifestation of the right to self-determination.144 Community protocols are also the 
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product of international and transnational networks of experts comprising state and non-state 
entities: they have already been developed through the involvement of networks of NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations (the UN Environment Programme), and bilateral donors, as 
well as the private sector,145 with a view to preparing communities before engaging in 
contractual negotiations with bioprospectors. The Nagoya Protocol specifically recognizes 
this innovative instrument and requires states parties to support as appropriate their 
development by indigenous and local communities.146 
It is not far-fetched to assume that both the EU147 and the US148 will engage in 
bilateral initiatives with a view to supporting the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in 
third countries, possibly through a mix of trade and aid measures. Within and beyond the 
framework of the Nagoya Protocol, therefore, we could witness an ever greater evolution of 
bilateralism: while traditional bilateralism was concerned only with the treatment of one 
state’s own national abroad,149 bilateralism in the service of the effective implementation of 
the Nagoya Protocol will rather concern itself with the treatment of communities of third 
countries’ nationals in those third countries. Such bilateral initiatives will present even more 
complex risks relating to their support for multilateralism because of the significance of 
common but differentiated responsibility under the Protocol, and the sheer amount of 
financial and technical assistance needed to support developing country parties in facing 
unprecedented compliance challenges. Indeed, the Nagoya Protocol includes several 
references to the capacity needs and priorities of developing countries and of indigenous and 
local communities, in recognition of their role in implementing the Protocol and their specific 
needs and rights that may differ from those of the state in which they reside, as well as other 
stakeholders such as NGOs and the private sector.150 
                                       
145 See the UNEP website on community protocols case studies, available at:  
www.unep.org/communityprotocols/casestudies.asp; and the website of a coalition of different actors on 
community protocols, available at:  www.community-protocols.org/.   
146 Jonas, Bavikatte, and Shrumm, supra note 143, at 68. 
147 Council, ‘Conclusions on Convention on Biological Diversity: Follow-up to Nagoya Conference’, 20 Dec. 
2010. See also Morgera, ‘The Trajectory of EU Biodiversity Cooperation: Supporting Environmental 
Multilateralism through EU External Action’, in E.  Morgera (ed.), supra note 98. Certain EU bilateral 
agreements already contain clauses on cooperation on ABS: EU–OPE FTA, supra note 99, Art. 272. 
148 US–Peru FTA, supra note 93, Art. 18.11: Jinnah, supra note 96, at 209, refers to this provision as a ‘nursery 
for the development of CBD norms and principles within a US policy context’. 
149 Simma, supra note *, at 243. 
150 The Nagoya Protocol indeed addresses in a lengthy provision (Art. 22) the paramount importance of 
capacity-building, making specific reference to existing global, regional, subregional, and national institutions 
and organizations that may be involved in international cooperation on capacity building. So, the proposed 
approach to ABS capacity-building cooperation – that is, country-driven, mindful of financial solidarity 
obligations under the CBD, and with the involvement of indigenous and local communities and other 
stakeholder in accordance with Nagoya Protocol Art. 12(3) and (1) – is expected to be reflected also in 
unilateral and bilateral development assistance.  
 Supporting the development of access and benefit-sharing laws in developing 
countries will occur not only in the interest of the international community in the effective 
implementation of the Protocol, but also in developed countries’ own interest (to ensure 
predictability and fairness for their users), while avoiding any undue influence or pressure on 
provider countries’ exercise of their national sovereignty over their genetic resources and on 
indigenous and local communities.  The delicate, and in many respects still open-ended, 
balance of international obligations enshrined in the Nagoya Protocol will thus create both 
opportunities for bilateral initiatives to contribute to effective implementation as a single best 
effort, and risks that these initiatives will undermine the unprecedented form of partnership 
between user and provider countries under the Protocol.151 
 
4 Conclusions: Analysing Bilateralism through the Lens of Global Environmental Law  
A nouvelle vague of bilateralism is emerging: enforcement of multilateral environmental 
agreements as a single-best-effort global public good is not necessarily seen as an alternative 
to ‘non-existent or ineffective multilateral enforcement’,152 but rather as complementing 
existing and effective compliance mechanisms (such as that under CITES) that aim to deliver 
the same global public good through an aggregate effort. The choice is therefore no longer 
between unilateralism, multilateralism, or ‘doing nothing’,153 but rather between a wider 
array of more or less collaborative forms of mini-lateral support for multilateralism. The shift 
is quite clear in the context of CITES, and more recent international environmental 
agreements, such as the Nagoya Protocol, may provide even more challenging avenues for 
bilateralism to serve the interests of the international community within an intricate web of 
different legal orders.  
The shift towards bilateralism may be explained by the intent to ensure compatibility 
with the law of the World Trade Organization in light of the Shrimp–Turtle case.154 Even in 
that light, however, the analysis need not be limited to the form in which single-best effort 
                                       
151 Although CBD developed-country Parties have mostly characterized themselves as user countries and 
developing ones as provider countries, ‘[p]arties that are countries of origin of genetic resources may be both 
users and providers and that Parties that have acquired these genetic resources in accordance with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity may also be both users and providers’ (CBD Decision VII/19 D, recital 16). 
152 Bodansky, supra note 53, at 346. 
153 Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (2010), at 237. 
154 WTO Appellate Body report, “United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia”, 22 Oct. 2001, WT/DS58/AB/RW. It was found that the US’s 
(unsuccessful) bilateral negotiations with countries targeted by its environmental trade restrictions were relevant 
for determining the WTO law compatibility of the measure (the point is made by Kulovesi in Kulovesi, 
Morgera, and Munoz, 'Environmental integration and multi-faceted international dimensions of EU law: 
Unpacking the EU’s 2009 climate and energy package', 48 CMLRev (2011) 829, at 885. 
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global public goods are supplied: bilateral initiatives may still be largely dominated by one 
party in particular, which imposes its interpretation of international agreements and of the 
findings of compliance mechanisms. The distinct US and EU approaches (the one sanction-
based, the other incentive-based) to bilateral initiatives and their different selections of 
relevant multilateral environmental agreements155 certainly speak of their de facto dominant 
position in their partnership with other states, based on the partner countries’ dependence on 
market access to the EU or US – possibly to the point of accepting ‘deep regulatory 
intrusion’.156 A certain degree of unilateralism may thus still be detected in bilateral 
initiatives. In addition, the analysis should be broadened to the network of national laws 
underpinning certain bilateral efforts, and include the question whether the combination of 
the two approaches actually results in ‘contingent unilateralism’ rather than true 
bilateralism.157 Equally, unilateral initiatives are now becoming injected with some elements 
of bilateralism: for instance, the EU Generalized System of Preferences, in assessing whether 
beneficiary countries support the effective implementation of selected multilateral 
environmental agreements,158 uses ‘dialogues’ where shortcomings in implementation can be 
jointly discussed with beneficiary countries on an ongoing basis, rather than only relying on a 
unilateral determination by the European Commission.159  
Does the new wave of bilateralism truly serve community interests?  It remains to be 
seen on a case-by-case basis whether the return to bilateralism160 actually serves the priorities 
established at the multilateral level by the international community, or rather the hidden, 
                                       
155 As opposed to the core multilateral agreements listed in EU bilateral agreements (supra note 99), the US–
Peru,  FTA, supra note 93 (Annex 18.2) includes: the 1987 Protocol relating to the International Convention on 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 17 Feb. 1978, 1340 UNTS 61; the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance, 2 Feb. 1971, 996 UNTS 245; the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Living 
Marine Resources, 20 May 1980, 1329 UNTS 47; the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, 2 
Dec. 1946, 161 UNTS 74; and the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission, 31 May 1949, 80 UNTS 3. Only CITES and the Montreal Protocol are common to both lists. 
156 Jinnah, supra note 96, at 210. 
157 This argument has been made with reference to bilateral agreements on sustainable biofuel production 
promoted by the EU through its own renewable energy regulation: Scott, ‘The Multi-level Governance of 
Climate Change’, 4 Carbon and Climate L Rev (2011) 25. For a discussion on links between internal regulation, 
bilateral and multilateral initiatives see Marin Duran and Morgera, supra note 118, at ch. 7. 
158 Ibid., at ch. 3; Switzer, ‘Environmental Protection and the Generalised System of Preferences: a Legal and 
Appropriate Linkage?’, 57 ICLQ (2008) 113. 
159 It appears that in the context of ‘GSP+dialogues’, the Commission can raise any issues relating to the 
effective implementation of selected multilateral environmental agreements, indicate shortcomings in 
implementation, provide time for reaction, and encourage third parties to cooperate with the agreements’ 
monitoring bodies: Zvelc, supra note 98. Zvelc also emphasizes that further elements of bilateralism are 
proposed for the revision of the GSP, such as third party direct involvement in monitoring their own compliance 
with the multilateral environmental agreements: European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and Council Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences’, COM(2011)241, Art. 
15(2). 
160 At the origins of international environment law, a ‘movement from bilateralism to community concerns in 
international law’ had been witnessed: Simma, supra note *, at 238. 
 more egoistic agenda of individual states’ own ‘parochial national interests’,161 thus 
undermining the ‘higher unity’ of the international community.162 Such a hidden agenda 
could comprise competitive interests163 or the desire to make one country’s interpretation of 
international law or priorities in ongoing multilateral negotiations prevail.164 More 
realistically, one can take for granted that bilateralism involves an inevitably mixed agenda 
that should then be evaluated on the basis of the balance achieved between the protection of 
the interests of the international community and the interests of individual states in the light 
of implications at the multilateral level,165 but also at the national and local level.  
Ultimately the legitimacy of single-best-effort global public goods rests on 
international law both as substance and process.166 Multilateral treaties remain the 
‘indispensable tool for fostering community interests’167 also beyond multilateral 
frameworks. Good faith and dialogue are also essential ingredients for cooperation, within 
and beyond multilateral frameworks, based on the respect for sovereign equality among 
partner countries,168 and they become particularly relevant when countries partnering each 
other in supplying single-best-effort global public goods have differentiated responsibility. 
Legitimacy, in addition, depends not only on reliance on multilateral norms but also on 
multilateral institutions,169 such as compliance mechanisms, that are essential to the effective 
promotion and protection of the international community’s interests. Reliance on 
international institutions may thus contribute to dispelling the ‘danger of abuse’ by individual 
states or groups of states based on lack of objectivity and evenhandedness in the pursuit of 
community interests.170 The legitimacy of single-best-effort global public goods further rests 
on continued responsiveness to intervening developments within the multilateral framework, 
                                       
161 Bodansky, supra note 53, at 345. 
162 Ibid., at 245. 
163 That is the desire to ‘ensure a level playing field between regional partners with regard to environmental 
standards’: Marín Durán, ‘The Role of the EU in Shaping the Trade and Environment Regulatory Nexus: 
Multilateral and Regional Approaches’, in B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans, and J. Wouters (eds), The Legal 
Dimension of Global Governance: What Role for the EU? (forthcoming 2012). 
164 Marín Durán, ‘Environmental Integration in EU Development Cooperation: Responding to International 
Commitments or Its Own Policy Priorities?’, in Morgera (ed), supra note 98; Marin Duran and Morgera, supra 
note 118, at ch. 5. Note, for instance, that the European Commission makes it clear that its external funding for 
the environment aims, inter alia, to see international environmental governance ‘shaped by the external 
dimensions of the EU’s environment and climate change policies’: European Commission, ‘Environment and 
natural resources thematic programme – 2011–2013 strategy paper and multiannual indicative programme’, 29 
Oct. 2010, at 25. 
165 Villalpando, supra note 29, at 415 and 418–419. 
166 Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 52, at 325, 329, and 338; on the need for substantive and procedural 
lawfulness of unauthorized unilateral actions see also Reisman, supra note 61, at 3–4. 
167 Simma, supra note *, at 324. 
168 Dupuy, supra note 63, at 22–23. 
169 Simma, supra note *, at 285 and 338–340. 
170 Ibid., at 319. 
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including the determinations by multilateral environmental agreements’ governing and 
compliance bodies relating to the link between financial solidarity, capacity building, and 
compliance.171  
Not only is the global public goods literature useful in understanding developments in 
international environmental law, but international environmental law can challenge the 
assumptions of the global public goods literature. In particular, common but differentiated 
responsibility emerges both as a justification for countries to take the lead and supply single-
best-effort global public goods in support of multilateralism, in the face of flaws or delays in 
multilateralism, but also – equally significantly – as a substantive limitation for bilateral 
initiatives not to undermine multilateral determinations relating to financial and technical 
solidarity. To that end, therefore, the analysis needs to transcend the trade and environment 
debate and also fully take on board the aid and environment link as an essential element for 
assessing the degree of legitimacy in bilateral relations: attempts to support multilateralism 
through bilateral initiatives based on trade sanctions or trade incentives beyond the capacities 
of partner countries are to be balanced with appropriate and equitable transfers of finance 
and/or technology at the bilateral level. This seems particularly timely as the ‘paradoxical’ 
trend of voluntary financing and technology transfer under the international law of 
cooperation172 is increasingly challenged at the multilateral level: in the context of the 
international biodiversity regime, for instance, detailed guidelines are being elaborated on 
financial solidarity and incipient forms of multilateral monitoring of international solidarity 
obligations are being considered.173 In that regard, common but differentiated responsibility 
serves as the ultimate test for the legitimacy of supplying a global public good through single 
best efforts, making sure these truly reinforce – rather than undermine – multilateral 
cooperation as an aggregate-efforts global public good.   
Finally, global environmental law may offer a particularly useful approach to the 
study of bilateral and other single-best-effort initiatives as a building block, rather than a 
stumbling block, towards effective multilateralism, by drawing attention to the interactions 
between international, national, local, and transnational law, and the different roles of states, 
                                       
171 Morgera, 'Ambition, Complexity and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual Supportiveness through the EU's 
External Environmental Action', in Van Vooren, Blockmans, and Wouters, supra note 162. 
172 Abi-Saab, supra note 37, at 263. 
173 For a discussion in the context of the CBD see Morgera and Tsioumani, 'Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: 
Looking Afresh at the Convention on Biological Diversity', (2011) YbIEL, available at: 
http://yielaw.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/11/10/yiel.yvr003.full.pdf+html, at 25–29. Note that in the 
global public goods literature, compliance with funding obligations increases if there is a way to verify which 
countries have paid their dues even in the absence of an explicit enforcement mechanism, particularly when 
underlying decisions have been taken by consensus: Barrett, supra note 31, at 123. 
 non-state actors, and international bodies such as compliance mechanisms. Comparative 
analysis would be particularly useful to illuminate whether and to what extent the differences 
in the EU’s and US’s bilateral initiatives affect the implementation of international 
environmental law in certain countries through national law, and in parallel their implications 
within the relevant multilateral frameworks.174 Further study of the supply of aggregate-
efforts and single-best-effort global public goods from the viewpoint of global environmental 
law is thus needed in order to clarify how different norms, institutional links, and approaches 
that thrive on the plurality of legal orders are affecting the pursuit of the international 
community’s interests. 
                                       
174 The realm of environmental law appears a particularly fruitful ground for research on the interactions 
between domestic and international law, as well as implications for state and non-state actors, as highlighted by 
Ellis, supra note 11, at 952. 
